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Cross-Country Analysis of Auditor Specialization Premium: Effect of Legal, 
Extra-legal and Political Environments 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Previous literature has provided mixed evidence of a premium in audit fee for 
industry-specialist auditors in US and other developed countries.  In this cross-country 
study spanning twelve non-US countries, we provide evidence of such a premium in 
the international context, implying that specialist auditors provide a higher level of 
investor assurance than non-specialists. Further, we show that the average audit fee in 
countries with effective legal, extra-legal and political institutions is higher but the 
specialization premium is lower than in other countries. We interpret this finding as 
evidence that while effective institutions increase the demand for average level of 
audit assurance, they substitute rather than complement the incremental assurance 
provided by specialist auditors. This finding is reinforced by additional analysis that 
shows no significant specialization premium in the US, a country where institutions 
are most conducive to high financial statement assurance.  
 
 
Keywords: Audit specialization, Legal protection, Extra-legal institutions, Political 
Economy 
 
JEL Codes: G15; L11; M41; M49 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There has been much recent interest in how country-wide legal, extra-legal and 
political institutions affect average earnings quality of all the firms listed in that 
country. At the firm level, auditing is one of the primary mechanisms used to provide 
assurance on earnings quality. There are two ways in which these institutions might 
interact with the audit function. First, every auditor operating in a country with strong 
legal, extra-legal and political institutions will face higher legal consequences and 
greater reputation loss in case of an audit failure. This increased institutional demand 
for audit quality is likely to provide every auditor a stronger incentive to acquire both 
industry-specific and client-specific audit-relevant knowledge and deploy such 
knowledge to produce an audit of higher quality. We expect this demand to be 
manifested as higher audit fees in countries with strong institutions. Second, effective 
institutions also improve the quality of clients’ pre-audit reports by imposing a higher 
risk for mis-reporting. Jointly, the incentive for non-specialist auditors to acquire 
industry knowledge and improved pre-audit information provided by clients are likely 
to reduce the incremental value of assurance provided by specialist auditors. In the 
context of very effective institutions and strong enforcement mechanisms, the value of 
such incremental industry knowledge might disappear altogether.  
 
The above reasoning suggests a substitutive effect of institutional strength on the 
premium fees paid to an industry specialist. Such a substitutive effect, however, is not 
a foregone conclusion. Strong institutions improve transparency in reporting and 
could thereby increase the value of a specialist in interpreting firm-level disclosures. 
This possibility of complementary effect of institutions on specialist premium makes 
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the examination of their role in the determination of specialist auditor premium an 
empirical question.  
 
In this paper, we investigate the role of institutions1 in the production and demand 
functions for audit services. Using twelve non-US countries, we investigate the role of 
institutions on both the average audit fees and the fee premium paid to specialist 
auditors. First, we find evidence that specialist premium exists in these countries. 
Second, we find that average audit fee is higher but the specialist audit fee premium is 
lower in countries with relatively stronger institutions. This evidence is supportive of 
a substitutive relationship between institutional strength and the demand for 
incremental assurance from specialist auditors. In additional analysis, we expand the 
sample to include US2 and find that the evidence continues to support a substitutive 
relationship. Further, consistent with the literature, the specialist premium completely 
disappears when only US and/or UK data is used. As such, these findings provide a 
vital step in understanding the role of institutions in the audit production function and 
through that, their effect on earnings quality.  
 
This paper’s primary contribution to the literature is the insight it provides on the role 
of the country-wide legal, extra-legal and political institutions in the determination of 
average audit fees and the fee premium paid to specialist auditors. First, it provides 
evidence consistent with the current literature that strong institutions increase average 
audit fees. Second, it provides evidence that in the presence of strong institutions a 
                                                 
1  We refer to legal, extra-legal and political institutions in this paper as “institutions”. 
2  We include US only in the additional analysis because the data in the US is available only after 2000. 
We use the US data from 2000 to 2004. Another limitation of the US data is that these years for which 
audit fee is available spans the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act which significantly changed the 
audit fee structure. 
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lower premium is commanded by specialist-auditors over non-specialist auditors. We 
interpret this evidence as indicating that the market perceives improved reporting 
environment resulting from strong institutions as a substitute for incremental 
assurance provided by specialist auditors over non-specialist auditors.  Put another 
way, the value of specialist auditor is higher in jurisdictions where the supporting 
legal, extra-legal or political systems are less effective. To the auditors, the results 
indicate that audit specialization is incrementally more (less) valuable when the 
institutional environment is weak (strong).  To the analysts, the results suggest that 
the credibility of financial statements depends both on the auditor as well as on the 
underlying institutional structure in that jurisdiction.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Related work is given in the next section. The third 
section provides the conceptual framework, the measures of legal, extra-legal and 
political institutions and our expectations. The models, analysis and the results are 
given in the fourth section. The findings are discussed and the conclusions are 
provided in the fifth and final section. 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
Investors demand assurance of financial statements provided by auditors (See Brown 
and Pinello 2007) to reduce information asymmetry and systematic information risk 
(Chen et al. 2008). The demand for audit assurance is transmitted by the investors to 
the firm through its board. In countries with effective institutions, the board members 
face greater personal legal and reputation risks. These risks make them demand a 
higher quality of audit (Carcello et al. 2002).  
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Prior literature from the US and other advanced economies with strong institutions 
gives mixed evidence about the existence of specialist premium. Carson and Fargher 
(2007) find evidence of specialist fee premium in Australia but Ferguson and Stokes 
(2002) find only limited support for it. Ferguson et al. (2006) find evidence of a 
premium for city level industry leaders but not for national level industry specialists.  
Using US data, Casterella et al. (2004) employ Porter’s framework (Porter 1985) and 
argue that industry specialization by auditors is a sustainable differentiation strategy 
that will lead to higher audit fees only if clients perceive them as providing a higher 
level of assurance than non-specialists. They find evidene of such premium. Huang et 
al. (2007) provide supporting evidence for Casterella et al. (2004) in the post-SOX 
period. A number of studies in the literature provide direct evidence of higher 
assurance levels provided by specialist auditors. Balsam et al. (2003) show that clients 
of specialist auditors have lower discretionary accruals and higher earnings response 
coefficient after controlling for auditor brand name. Craswell et al. (1995) and  
Beasley and Petroni (2001)  provide additional support for higher levels of assurance 
supplied by specialist auditors incrementally over non-specialist brand name auditors.  
Many other studies provide indirect but yet compelling supportive evidence for higher 
assurance levels supplied by specialist auditors. For example, Lim and Tan (2008) 
show that specialist auditors are likely to exhibit greater independence than non-
specialist auditors vis-à-vis non-audit fees.  Knechel et al. (2007) show that client 
firms switching to a big-4 specialist auditors show significant positive abnormal 
returns in the market that is indicative of lower information risk and a higher 
perceived level of audit assurance. Dunn and Mayhew (2004) argue that the choice of 
an industry-specialist auditor is associated with enhanced client disclosures which in 
turn, increase the assurance level. We argue that the specialist auditors have both the 
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incentive and the ability to provide greater assurance. Specialist auditors are often 
market leaders in that client industry and the consequences of audit failure are likely 
to be more severe for them compared to non-specialists. This provides them the 
incentive for exerting higher effort and providing greater assurance. Further, their 
superior specific industry knowledge gives them the ability to provide greater 
assurance than non-specialists.  
 
A different strand of literature has documented the role of legal, extra-legal and 
political institutions in reducing the consumption of private control benefits by 
insiders (Dyck and Zingales 2004; LaPorta et al. 1998; Haw et al. 2004). The 
potential for private control benefits provides incentive to insiders to distort the 
financial reports and thereby decrease their credibility (Leuz et al. 2003). By reducing 
the private control benefits, the institutional factors improve the credibility of 
financial statements. Furthermore, stronger legal enforcement supported by extra-
legal institutions that promote dissemination of information and a compliance culture 
and political institutions that prevent unhealthy interference by the political system 
increase the legal and reputation consequences faced by auditors. By providing 
incentives for better reporting by managers and increasing the adverse consequences 
for negligent auditing, strong institutions improve the overall reporting environment 
in which the financial statements are prepared and disseminated. Surprisingly, there 
has been little research to date on the interplay between auditing and these 
institutional factors, given that both are involved in improving the assurance in 
reporting.  
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III. FRAMEWORK, MEASURES AND EXPECTATION 
The Framework 
The quality of audit provided by the auditor has been defined as the market-assessed 
joint probability that an auditor will both discover a breach in the client’s accounting 
system and then report the breaches that are found (DeAngelo, 1981). The probability 
that an auditor will discover a breach is determined by his knowledge and the 
probability that he will report such a breach is determined by his independence. An 
auditor’s knowledge is composed of two components: industry-specific knowledge 
and client-specific knowledge. Industry-specific knowledge is valuable for the auditor 
in identifying a client’s accounting outcomes that might be inaccurate in the context 
of client’s industry. The value of an auditor’s specialized industry knowledge derives 
from this increased ability to identify inaccuracies and direct his detection effort to 
them thereby providing greater assurance to the investor and to the board.   
 
In countries where the institutional framework is strong, the members of the board 
will face more personal litigation risk and will, through the audit committee and 
through discussions with the management, translate the demand for higher audit 
quality to decisions involving the appointment and the terms and conditions of the 
auditor.  Further, they will be willing to compensate the auditor for providing the 
higher audit quality. In response to this demand, auditors will supply the required 
quality in terms of both higher knowledge and greater independence. If the country-
wide demand for audit quality is high, the average auditor will be induced to supply 
this quality through more knowledge and independence. Alternately, strong 
institutions assume strong enforcement and auditing could be viewed as one of the 
enforcement mechanisms. In other words, institutions may owe their strength to a 
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strong audit mechanism in place.3 These arguments support a positive relationship 
between effective institutions and average audit fees. 
 
Recent literature shows that the reporting environment is shaped by country-specific 
institutional structures (Ball et al. 2000; Ball et al. 2003; Gul 2006; Dyck and Zingales 
2004) that include the legal and judicial systems, product-market competition, press 
coverage, tax compliance and political economy. However, it is not clear ex-ante how 
the institutions relate to specialist audit fee premium. The relationship could be 
substitutive if we assume that the demand for assurance of financial statements can be 
satisfied by the audit quality at the firm level and a better reporting environment at the 
country level. To elaborate, if the country-wide demand is weak, investors and board 
members in some firms will still need that assurance and will, through the board, seek 
out independent auditors with specialized knowledge who can supply that quality. 
Hiring highly credible auditors is perhaps one of the few ways that a firm can pre-
commit to convey firm-specific information (Jin and Myers, 2006). In such countries, 
the supply of specialized knowledge is limited and scarce, making it more valuable 
and sought after by some firms’ board members who are willing to pay a premium. 
This is the essence of the substitution argument. A number of studies support the 
substitution argument in other related contexts. A recent cross-country paper by Choi 
et al. (2008) provides evidence that the big-4 premium is lower in countries with good 
legal environment. Choi and Wong (2007) find that Big 5 auditors fulfill a strong 
governance function in weak legal environments. Anderson et al. (1993) show 
substitutive effects among external auditing, internal auditing and board governance. 
Chambers and Payne (2008) show bigger earnings quality gains in firms audited by 
                                                 
3  We are grateful to the reviewer for pointing this out. 
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non-specialist auditors in the post-SOX period – a result that indicates substitution 
between overall assurance provided by effective regulation and incremental assurance 
provided by specialist auditors.  
 
On the other hand, strong institutional structures encourage more timely disclosure 
and greater transparency (Pagano and Volpin 2001; Pagano and Volpin 2005; 
Darrough and Stoughton 1990). Firm-specific disclosures could become more 
meaningful and potentially more valuable if the information is interpreted in the 
context of industry expertise.4 In effect, a strong institutional structure could make 
industry-specific knowledge more valuable, introducing a complementary relationship 
between specialist audit fee premium and the institutional variables.  
 
A number of studies have shown that the corporate governance environment limits 
discretionary earnings management (Agrawal and Chadha 2005; Leuz et al. 2003; 
Yeo et al. 2002), decreases the cost of capital (Andersen et al. 2004; Ashbaugh et al. 
2006), improves disclosure (Ajinkya et al. 2005) and improves the pay-performance 
relationship in compensation contracts (Antonio DavilaFernando 2006; Bebchuk and 
Fried 2006). Ceteris Paribus, audit fee is lower for firms with low discretionary 
earnings management (Gul et al. 2003) and for firms with better disclosure (Ascioglu 
et al. 2005), indicating that a good governance environment improves the inherent 
quality of financial statements and thereby reduces the demand for additional audit 
assurance. Some governance variables, such as the board size, independence, CEO 
duality are primarily firm-specific.  At the country-wide level, the governance 
characterized primarily by the legal protection of shareholder rights (Gompers et al. 
                                                 
4 For example when new product milestones are disclosed, only a discerning specialist could better 
estimate which of the existing products might become obsolescent at what future time. Those estimates 
are essential for assessing the inventory values. 
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2003; Bebchuk et al. 2004; LaPorta et al. 1998) is subsumed by the legal, extra-legal 
and political economy variables. The country-level ownership concentration and anti-
director rights (LaPorta et al. 1998) are used as additional governance variables.  
 
Consistent with prior literature on legal environment (LaPorta et al. 2002; LaPorta et 
al. 1997), Kwon et al. (2007) study twenty eight countries over twenty industries and 
show that the improvement in earnings quality by engaging industry-specialized 
auditors is lower in countries with strong legal protection. This lends credence to the 
argument that the legal protection offered to shareholders improves the inherent 
quality of financial statements. In a similar vein, Haw at al. (2004) examine the extra-
legal institutions such as competition laws, media pressure and tax enforcement (See 
Dyck and Zingales 2004 regarding the extra-legal institutions) and find that these 
factors constrain earnings management. Further, Pagano and Volpin (2005) argue that 
both the legal system and economic outcomes are determined by the political system. 
Bushman et al. (2004) use risk of expropriation, state ownership and the cost of entry 
as variables to measure the political economies of countries and find an impact of 
these variables on the corporate transparency of firms operating in those political 
environments. A number of other recent studies also identify country-specific political 
variables as determinants of political development and reporting incentives (LaPorta 
et al. 2000a; LaPorta et al. 2000b; LaPorta et al. 2002; Rajan and Zingales 2003). 
These studies suggest that the reporting environment is likely to be better in countries 
with less risk of expropriation, lower state ownership and lower cost of entry.  
 
Effect of legal variables on the specialist fee premium 
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We list here four possible effects of legal variables on specialist premium. First, 
Haw et al. (2004) provide evidence that legal variables such as the rule of law index 
and judicial efficiency (LaPorta et al. 1998) could reduce the extraction of private 
control benefits by controlling shareholders and thereby reduce the agency problem 
between insiders and outsiders.  Consequently, the need for insiders to “hide” their 
transactions (now that there are fewer of them) by earnings management is reduced. 
If there is less opportunistic earnings management (used to hide private transactions 
that help insiders but hurt outsiders), investors perceive greater assurance in the 
reported earnings thereby reducing the incremental assurance value added by the 
specialists. Second, in countries with strong legal institutions, both the reputation 
risk faced by managers and the expected cost of litigation for not promptly revealing 
value-relevant bad information are high. Therefore, we expect a speedier disclosure 
of any information that might adversely affect the current or future performance of 
the firm. From the investor’s viewpoint, the cost of undisclosed bad news is typically 
higher than the cost of unrealized good news.5  The asymmetric conservatism in 
reporting whereby bad news is reported more promptly than good news, is shown to 
reduce verification costs (Holthausen and Watts 2001; Roychowdhury and Watts 
2007; Watts 2003a, 2003b). Given that the firm has incentives to report 
conservatively even without audit input, the incremental value added by specialist 
auditors in this context is correspondingly reduced. Third, legal regimes that give 
more rights to investors promote shareholder activism and support constraints placed 
on financing by creditors. These limitations constrain managers in their accrual 
estimates, mitigating the need for additional assurance on the veracity of reported 
                                                 
5   Promptly reporting bad news but deferring the good news in accounting earnings is studied 
extensively in the Conservatism literature (Basu 1997; Ball and Shivakumar 2005). Watts (Watts 2003a, 
2003b) have shown that such conditional conservatism reduces verification costs by auditors and is 
associated with lower cost of capital for the firm.  
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earnings by specialist auditors. Fourth, strong legal regimes encourage strong 
markets for corporate control which also limit managers from deviating from 
shareholder interest (Coffee 2001; Monga 2006).  This also improves the value 
relevance of earnings (Srinidhi and Sen 2007) and reduces the incremental demand 
for assurance by specialist auditors.  These four linkages between legal variables and 
specialist fee premium all suggest a negative (substitutive) association between them.  
 
In contrast to the above arguments, a strong legal environment induces more 
disclosures from managers. A specialist auditor might possess the requisite industry 
knowledge to better interpret these disclosures. In turn, a better interpretation of 
additional disclosures could make the services of a specialist auditor more valuable 
and thereby increases the specialist fee premium.  It is therefore essentially an 
empirical issue as to whether the substitutive or the complementary relationship 
dominates.  
 
The legal variables we use to measure the legal system are both from LaPorta et al. 
(1998): (i) the Rule of Law index and (ii) the efficiency of the judicial system. The 
detailed descriptions of all the variables are given in Exhibit 1. These two variables 
capture the legal system and tradition as well as the efficiency of enforcement.  
 
Effect of extra-legal variables on the specialist fee premium 
The extra-legal institutions considered in this study are drawn primarily from Dyck 
and Zingales (2004). They include the effectiveness of product competition, the per-
capita circulation of daily newspapers and the rate of tax compliance. While an 
effective legal system impedes opportunistic actions and expropriation devices that 
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are clear and detectable, a number of executive actions fall in the “grey” areas that 
are not clear and detectable by law. Rather, they can be constrained more effectively 
by the marketplace and reputation effects. Haw et al. (2004) show how these extra-
legal institutions, in conjunction with the legal systems, can constrain opportunistic 
earnings management. 
 
We argue that these three extra-legal variables can affect the specialist fee premium. 
Consistent with Haw et al. (2004), we argue that product competition effectively 
reduces the consumption of private benefits because such consumption will make the 
firm less competitive, less profitable and in turn, less attractive to the managers. 
Further, in a competitive market, the costs and prices are both easy to estimate and 
the market is likely to significantly penalize managers involved in any deliberate 
distortion of prices. These forces limit opportunistic behavior and reduce the 
opportunity for earnings management. Reduced earnings management in turn 
reduces the value of incremental assurance from specialist auditors to investors. 
Furthermore, higher product competition could result in greater disclosures on 
products6 (Darrough and Stoughton 1990). These additional disclosures reduce the 
verification cost for investors further reducing the incremental demand for specialist 
auditor monitoring. 
 
We have argued above that discipline is imposed on managers partly by the fear of 
reputation loss resulting from opportunistic actions and reporting. Higher newspaper 
coverage and educated investor population that reads newspapers affect the 
                                                 
6  There is a debate on which of the two effects is stronger: (i)  higher disclosures could benefit the firm 
by increasing  the cost of entry in that product for competitors or (ii) higher disclosures could reduce 
the rents from proprietary information and thereby increase the cost. This question has not been 
generally resolved but the literature has identified contexts in which one or the other effect might be 
stronger.  
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magnitude of this reputation loss. Free, fair and extensive press diffusion therefore 
leads to more accurate reporting by managers that could reduce the incremental 
demand for assurance by specialist auditors under the substitution argument or 
increase it under the complementary relationship argument.  
 
Tax authorities have the objective of verifying the income produced by the firm  
(Dyck and Zingales 2004), albeit as per tax rules rather than GAAP. However, the 
verification role carried out by tax authorities produces a degree of assurance for 
investors in regimes where tax regulation enforcement is strong. Strong tax law 
enforcement is measured by the degree of tax compliance. Therefore, under the 
substitution argument, the incremental demand for assurance by specialist auditors 
could be lower in a country with strong tax compliance.    
 
Effect of Political Economy variables on Specialist fee premium 
Consistent with Bushman et al. (2004), we measure political involvement of the 
government in business by the risk of expropriation, state ownership of enterprises 
and the cost of entry into the market. Bushman et al. (2004) show that these 
variables are significant in determining the financial transparency in a country, 
defined as the intensity of financial disclosures and their interpretation and 
dissemination by analysts and the media. First, the pressure to protect the 
expropriation and corruption by politicians and their cronies could adversely affect 
the accuracy of reported financial information in state ownership of enterprises. 
Second, government could impose additional cost on entrants to shield the economic 
rents of politically connected firms from competition and in the process restrict flow 
of information to the public to avoid undesirable scrutiny. Further, if there is a high 
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potential for direct expropriation by the government, more transparent firms face 
higher risk of expropriation both because it would be seen as being non-cooperative 
with corrupt politicians and because the transparency allows the government to 
muster arguments for expropriation of the firm’s assets and profits. Therefore, we 
expect all the three variables, the state ownership, cost of entry and the risk of 
expropriation to be associated with decreased accuracy of reporting. Specialist 
auditors could use their knowledge and leadership position to improve the assurance 
to outside investors under these circumstances. We therefore expect the specialist fee 
premium to be positively associated with political involvement by the government if 
substitutive relationship holds.  In summary, we expect these three variables to 
decrease the average audit fee but increase the specialist premium with greater 
political involvement, consistent with a substitutive relationship. 
 
Our expectations 
Based on the above arguments, we expect a specialist fee premium that reflects the 
incremental assurance value of specialized industry knowledge. We expect the value 
of specialized industry knowledge and therefore the resulting specialist premium to 
vary between different countries. Specifically, we expect a greater demand for audit 
assurance leading to higher average audit fees in countries with effective legal, 
extra-legal and political institutions. Further, in those countries, we expect even non-
specialist auditors to acquire greater audit-relevant knowledge thereby reducing the 
incremental value of specialist knowledge. We expect this substitutive role of 
specialist auditor to outweigh its complementary role.  
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 IV. THE MODEL, ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
The Basic Audit Fee Model 
We use the basic audit fee model developed in prior studies (Craswell and Francis 
1999; Simunic 1980; Seetharaman et al. 2002).7 The primary fee determinants are the 
client firm attributes that include size (the log of total assets in US dollars), inherent 
risk (inventory and receivables relative to total assets), control and other misstatement 
risks (proxied by audit opinion), operating risk (loss propensity and leverage – ratio of 
total liabilities over total assets), liquidity (quick ratio), profitability (return on assets) 
and complexity of operations (foreign operations, cross-listing in the US, utility firm). 
Client size, complexity,  diversity in operations, higher inherent risk, greater volatility 
in operations and low liquidity and/or profitability increase the needed audit effort to 
ensure a given assurance level. In addition to these client-level attributes, we include 
audit tenure that is shown to affect the quality of reported accounting earnings (Ghosh 
and Moon 2005; Myers et al. 2003; Carey and Simnett 2006; Srinidhi et al. 2008).  
 
In addition to the above variables which are client and auditor-specific, we include 
two country-specific variables. We include the country’s disclosure index because the 
required disclosures proxy for the demand for information by the market (Knechel 
and Willekens 2006; Seetharaman et al. 2002).  Consistent with Taylor and Simon 
(1999), we use the disclosure index developed by the Center for International 
Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR 1995). Our second country-wide variable is 
the country’s stock market capitalization relative to the gross domestic product (GDP), 
which is a proxy for market maturity (Beck et al. 2000).  
 
                                                 
7 There are over a hundred studies on the determinants of audit fees.  For a more complete description 
of audit fee studies, see Hay et al. (2006). 
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The specialist auditor identifier is included in the model as the treatment variable. 
Consistent with prior studies (Knechel et al. 2007; Ferguson and Stokes 2002), we 
determine auditor industry specialization by each auditor’s industry market share in a 
specific year, based on the percentage of companies audited in the industry.8  We do 
not use client sales to measure market share to avoid a mechanical association 
between client sales and audit fees. Instead, we compute market share based on 
number of clients audited by the auditors in the industry, a measure that is less 
correlated with audit fees. Moreover, using the number of clients as the base avoids 
the bias toward larger clients that is implied by using sales as the base (Balsam et al. 
2003).  Specialization variable, SPEC, is coded as ‘1’ if the auditor has the largest 
market share in that industry. We also use alternative measures of specialization in 
our robustness tests. The audit fee model, based on the above variables is as follows: 
ε++++
++++++
++++++=
SMDEVaLCIFARaTENUREa
UTILITYaCROSSaDISCOPaFOREIGNaROAaQUICKa
LEVaLOSSaOPINaINVRECaSIZEaSPECaaLFEE
151413
121110987
6543210
Model 1 
The definitions of the variables are given in Exhibit 1.  
[Insert Exhibit 1 here] 
The specialist fee premium is given by the coefficient a1. The effects of legal, extra-
legal and political variables are measured by interacting SPEC with the corresponding 
variable (denoted MEASURE) in the following model: 
                                                 
8 The industry is as defined as in Frankel et al. (2002)’s classification, based on SIC codes as follows: 
agriculture (0100–0999), mining & construction (1000–1999, excluding 1300–1399), food (2000–
2111), textiles & printing/publishing (2200–2799), chemicals (2800–2824, 2840–2899), 
pharmaceuticals (2830–2836), extractive (2900–2999, 1300–1399), financial institutions (6000–6999), 
durable manufacturers (3000–3999, excluding 3570–3579 and 3670–3679), transportation (4000–4899), 
utilities (4900–4999), retail (5000–5999), services (7000–8999, excluding 7370–7379), computers 
(3570–3579, 3670–3679, 7370–7379). 
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ε++++++
++++++
++++++=
MEASURESPECaMEASUREaSMDEVaLCIFARaTENUREa
UTILITYaCROSSaDISCOPaFOREIGNaROAaQUICKa
LEVaLOSSaOPINaINVRECaSIZEaSPECaaLFEE
*1716151413
121110987
6543210
 
Model 2 
In Model 2, the coefficient of the interaction measure, a17 measures the effect of the 
variable in question on the specialist premium.  Based on our substitutive 
relationship hypothesis, we expect a17 to be negative when Measure is a legal or 
extra-legal variable and positive when it is a political economy variable as defined in 
this study. 
 
The Sample 
Our sample spans the period from 1993 to 2004 across twelve countries for which the 
audit fee data is available in the Global Vantage database. The selection of the 
countries and periods is limited by fee data availability. To meaningfully compute and 
compare auditors’ market shares, across industries and countries, we require at least 
10 observations in each industry, for a particular year to be included in the sample. To 
control for the Big N brand name, we only include those firms audited by Big N in 
our analyses. The final sample consists of 20,459 firm-years from the following 
twelve countries: Australia, Denmark, France, Hong Kong, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
Norway, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  
 
Table 1, Panel A, provides the distribution of sample firms (individually) by year, 
country, and industry, and Panel B provides the joint distribution of firm-years by 
country and year. Predictably, the industries in which the firms function are 
distributed across countries in accordance with their competitive strengths. Resource-
rich economies such as Australia have a preponderance of mining firms and trading 
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economies such as Hong Kong and Singapore have a preponderance of retail firms. 
Countries such as UK where the data availability is good are represented in the 
sample more than the countries where the data availability is poor. The increase in the 
number of firms in later years is driven both by the improved data availability and by 
the growth in the economies over this period. The sample, therefore, might not be 
fully representative of the actual distribution of firms across different countries and 
industries over the period. This is admittedly a limitation resulting from the 
availability of required data.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
The descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study are given in Table 2. The 
definitions of all the variables are given in Exhibit 1. We report the values of the 
country-specific institutional variables, namely the legal, extra-legal and political 
economy variables in Panel A. These values are constant for each country over the 
sample period. The only exception is the stock market development variable 
(SMDEV) which is computed yearly and the mean values are reported. The factors 
LEG, ELEG, and POLITICAL are derived principal components from the legal, 
extra-legal and political variables respectively. Out of the twelve countries, Australia, 
and some European countries exhibit relatively higher scores in all three categories 
whereas Malaysia and South Africa exhibit relatively poorer scores. This clustering 
suggests strong correlations between these different treatment variables. Countries 
with higher scores represent relatively more informative reporting environments and 
countries with poor scores represent less informative reporting environments.  
 
Panel B of Table 2 gives the mean levels of audit fees and other firm-specific control 
variables for all the twelve countries. The audit fees are higher in France and the 
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United Kingdom, and lowest in Malaysia. A greater proportion of audit specialists 
are employed in some European countries (e.g., Denmark, Spain) and newly 
developed economies such as Hong Kong and Singapore. On the other hand, the 
employment of specialists is lower in France and Malaysia. Mean values for other 
variables used in the regression analysis are also reported in Panel B. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients for the variables used in the regression analysis9 
shows that the correlations are higher among the country-specific institutional 
variables, an issue that is common in cross-country research. We address the issue 
by analyzing the impacts of institutions one at a time. In addition, we construct a 
principal component for each set of variables representing the legal, extra-legal, and 
political institutions.  
 
We determine an industry specialist auditor as the auditor with the largest proportion 
of clients audited in that industry in any given country in any given year. Our tests 
require that market leadership in any industry be related to industry specialization and 
not driven by other parameters such as language or ethnicity. We constructed the 
distribution of industry market leaders10 in three sub-periods (before 1998 when there 
were six big auditors; between 1998 and 2001 when there were five big auditors; and 
after 2001 when there are four big auditors) across industries for each country. An 
examination of these distributions shows that generally within each country, there is 
industry dispersion among specialists and this changed across the three sub-periods. 
                                                 
9 Available with the authors. The correlation matrix has not been given in the paper in the interest of 
brevity.  
10  The tabulation of specialist auditors in the three sub-periods in each country is available from the 
authors on request. 
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Based on this distribution, we conclude that specialization is not likely to be driven by 
language or ethnicity parameters.  
 
We report the effect of legal variables on audit fees and specialization premium in 
Table 3. The regressions employ multiple observations over time. Such observations 
are unlikely to be fully independent, and thus regression residuals may be serially or 
cross-sectionally correlated. We run the regressions with clustered robust errors to 
account for both serial and cross-sectional correlations (Rogers 1993; Williams 2000; 
Petersen 2008). Petersen (2008) demonstrates that clustered standard errors are robust 
after adjusting for correlation of residuals over time and across firms. Following 
Petersen (2008), all our tests correct for both serial and cross-sectional correlations in 
the residuals by using the t-values based on clustered standard error (clustered by 
country and year).   
 
The first model shows the results of the basic audit fee model. Consistent with our 
expectations, firm size, inherent risk (inventory and receivables as a proportion of 
total assets), complexity (foreign operations), risk (loss), liquidity (quick ratio) and 
performance (ROA) are associated with audit fee in the predicted directions. The 
dummy for utility industry shows, as expected, a negative association because the 
audit effort needed for regulatory industries is lower, on average. Audit tenure, 
which proxies for client-specific knowledge, is not significant. Cross-listed firms 
have higher audit fees consistent with their binding themselves to a higher standard 
of reporting and verification. Our variable-of-interest, the specialization variable is 
positive and significant at 1% level, indicating the existence of a specialist audit fee 
premium.  
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 We next augment the basic fee model with the legal variables represented by RULE 
and EFF, and LEG (which is the principal component for the legal variables derived 
from a factor analysis). The results for the models (without the interaction term, 
SPEC*MEASURE) indicate that all three legal variables are positive and significant 
at 1% level, indicating that in jurisdictions where the legal protection is higher, the 
litigation risk faced by the auditors is high resulting in higher audit fees. In models 
with the interaction term, our results show that, for all the three regressions, the 
interaction between the legal variable and specialization variable is negative and 
significant at 1% level. This result is consistent with the substitution argument that 
the specialist premium is reduced in countries with strong legal protection because 
these countries are likely to have a more informative reporting environment, ceteris 
paribus. The result also refutes any complementary relationship between the legal 
environment and specialist fee premium.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
The effect of extra-legal variables is reported in Table 4.   Competition laws, 
newspaper coverage, tax compliance and a factor, ELEG that is the principal 
component of the three extra-legal variables are the treatment variables in Table 4.  
Stricter competition laws discourage monopolistic tendencies and consumption of 
private control benefits. Further, they increase the scrutiny of firm operations and put 
greater pressure on full and transparent disclosure. Newspaper coverage increases 
the openness of the reporting environment and increases the reputation risk for 
managers who consume private benefits and try to cover it up with misleading 
disclosures. Effective implementation of tax laws also points to a culture of greater 
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compliance and less misrepresentation. All these attributes encourage greater 
transparency and informativeness in the reporting environment.  
 
The coefficients of the control variables are similar to those reported in Table 3. In 
models without the interaction term, the specialization variable is significantly 
positive in all four regressions, indicating that the specialist audit fee premium exists. 
Two of the extra-legal variables, Competition and Newspaper Coverage show 
positive and significant associations which is consistent with the argument that under 
effective extra-legal institutions, the standard of verification is higher and this is 
reflected in the higher audit fee. The tax compliance variable does not show a 
significant association. In models with the interaction term, the interaction between 
specialization variable and the extra-legal variables are significant and negative in all 
the four regressions. This lends further support to the specialist fee premium 
substitution argument. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 Table 5 gives the effect of political economy variables on audit fees and specialist 
audit fee premium. Political economy variables used in the study include the risk of 
expropriation by the government, state ownership, the cost of entry, and a principal 
component of the three political economy variables. Unlike the legal and the extra-
legal variables, these variables are measured in a way that higher values reflect lower 
informativeness in the reporting environment. A greater risk of expropriation by the 
government reduces the incentive to give complete and full information and 
therefore, clouds the reporting environment. Similarly, greater state ownership and 
greater protection (cost of entry) reduce the incentive for informative and full 
reporting.   
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 As in earlier regressions, the signs of control variables are consistent with our 
expectations. In models without the interaction term, the specialization premium is 
significant and positive. Further, each one of the political economy variables is 
negatively associated with audit fees indicating that they diminish the 
informativeness in the reporting environment and provide less incentive for audit 
effort. In models that include the interaction term, we find that the interaction 
between the political variables and the specialization variable are all positively 
associated with audit fee at 1% level. When the reporting environment is adversely 
affected by the political variables, there is a greater demand for incremental 
assurance from specialist auditors.  This substitutive relationship is supported by the 
positive association of the interactions with audit fee.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Additional Tests and Results 
Effect of Governance Variables on Audit Fees and Specialist Auditor Premium 
The governance effectiveness is measured by the following three variables: (i) 
ownership concentration (OWN) reported in (LaPorta et al. 1998)11; (ii) Antidirector 
Rights (ANTIDIR), reported in La Porta et al. (1998) ranging from zero to five, with 
higher scores indicating greater protection of shareholders12 and (iii) GOVN, which 
is the principal component of the above two governance variables. Higher values for 
                                                 
11 Ownership concentration is the average percentage of common shares owned by the three largest 
shareholders in the 10 largest non-financial, private owned domestic firms in a given country. For ease 
of interpretation, we subtract the ownership concentration from one, with higher scores indicating 
higher quality of governance. 
12 The index aggregates the following components of shareholder rights: (1) the ability to vote by mail; 
(2) the ability to gain control of shares during the shareholders’ meeting; (3) the possibility of 
cumulative voting for directors; (4) the ease of calling an extraordinary shareholders meeting; and (5) 
the availability of a mechanism allowing minority shareholders to make legal claims against the 
directors. 
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OWN, ANTIDIR, and GOVN indicate better governance quality. The results are 
shown in Table 6.  
 
The governance variables (OWN and GOVN, but not ANTIDIR) are positive and 
statistically significant, indicating that the higher the governance score, the more 
informative is the reporting environment and hence the higher is the verification 
standard. Correspondingly, the audit fee is higher. More importantly, the interactions 
between all three governance variables and the specialization variable are negative 
and significant, which supports the substitution hypothesis between the assurance 
provided by the specialist auditor and the assurance provided by the informativeness 
of the reporting environment.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Incremental Effect of Legal and Extra-legal variables over governance 
Table 7 reports the results of incremental effects of legal and extra-legal variables 
over the governance variable. In the first column, we have included both the 
governance variable (GOVN) and the legal variable (LEG), both are principal 
components from the respective governance and legal variables. LEG is positively 
associated and the interaction between LEG and Specialization is negatively 
associated with audit fees. The governance variable and its interaction with 
specialization remain significant. This result indicates that the legal institutions seem 
to further contribute to the informativeness of reporting environment after 
controlling for governance. Furthermore, the substitutive effect of the legal variable 
on specialist audit fee premium is incremental to the substitutive effect of 
governance. The second column includes the extra-legal variable, ELEG (the 
principal component of extra-legal variables), and its interaction with specialization. 
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The interaction terms, GOVN*SPEC and ELEG*SPEC are both significant and 
negative indicating incremental substitutive effect. The interaction term LEG*SPEC 
is not significant though the sign is negative. In summary, these results show that the 
substitutive effect on specialist fee premium is incremented by extra legal variables 
over the governance variables but the effect of legal variables seems to be subsumed 
by governance and extra-legal variables. Further, in untabulated results, we added 
the political variable but the variance inflation factor became too high for a 
meaningful interpretation of the coefficients.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Alternative Measure of auditor specialization  
Consistent with prior studies, the tests reported hereto define specialist auditor as the 
industry leader, with the maximum number of audit clients in each industry. As a 
robustness check, we use an alternative measure of specialist auditor based on 
industry market shares (share of the number of audit clients in each industry) of 
more than 20% for the period 1993 to 1997, 24% for the period 1998 to 2001, and 
30% for the period 2002 to 2004. 13 We replicated all the analyses (untabulated) with 
this alternative definition of specialization. None of the results changed 
substantially.14  Further, the specialization variable could be picking up industry 
effects instead of specialist auditor effects. To control for this, we included twelve 
industry dummies. The results were not qualitatively altered.  
                                                 
13 Following Neal and Riley (2004), we employ a cut off for ‘large’ market shares of (1/N)*1.2, where 
N is the number of big international audit firms. The largest firms are the Big 6, during the period 
1993-1997, the Big 5 after the merger between Coopers and Lybrand and Price Waterhouse in 1998, 
and Big 4 after the demise of Arthur Andersen in 2002.  
14 The definitions of auditor specialization assume that the auditor with industry-specific knowledge 
will be the market leader in that industry. Another possibility is that the specialization variable might 
reflect client size and could become significant because size is not linearly related to audit fee. In 
order to guard against this possibility, we split the sample in each country at median size and 
conducted the tests on both large and small firms. The same significant results were obtained for both 
the large and small firms. This provides another control for potential non-linearity in the relationship. 
We thank the discussant for pointing this out.   
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Endogeneity of auditor choice and Clients’ characteristics 
The relation between auditor choice and clients’ characteristics would be endogenous 
if the characteristics of clients who choose to be audited by specialist auditors are 
systematically different from those of other firms. We use the Heckman correction 
(Heckman 1976) to correct the resulting self-selection bias by conducting a two-stage 
least squares analysis. In the first stage, we model the choice of specialist auditor by 
clients following Krishnan (2005), by the following logistic regression for each 
country: 
SPEC = γο + γ1LEV + γ2 CAPINTj + γ3 LSALEj + γ4 MB + γ5LOSSj + γ6 CR4 
 + γ7 REG +  e       Model 3 
where LEV is the total liabilities-to-asset ratio, CAPINT is capital intensity measured 
by gross property, plant and equipment divided by sales, LSALE is the log of sales in 
US dollars (proxy for size), MB is the market-to-book ratio (proxy for growth 
opportunities), LOSS is an indicator variable that equals one if net income is negative 
and zero otherwise, CR4 is the four-firm concentration ratio in an industry, REG is a 
dichotomous variable that equals one for regulated industry and zero otherwise.15  
Larger firms, firms with high capital intensity, firms that are likely to derive rents 
from concentration, high-growth firms and loss making firms have higher agency 
costs. The agency problem is likely to make the investors rely less on their financial 
statements. Therefore, these firms have a greater need to employ specialist auditors 
and pay premium fees to signal reliability of their financial statements. We expect the 
associations of these variables with the probability of specialist auditor choice to be 
positive. In the same vein, firms in regulated industries and firms with high leverage 
                                                 
15 Similar to Francis et al. (1999) (1999), and following Eichenseher and Danos (1981), REG is coded 
‘one’ if the industry is railroad (SICs 4011 and 4100), trucking (4210 and 4213), airlines (4512, 4513, 
4522, and 4581), telephone communications (4812 and 4813), electric companies (4911), gas 
companies (4922, 4923, 4924), and ‘zero’ otherwise. We do not include a variable that captures the 
operating cycle as the inclusion of that variable reduces our sample by more than 50%. 
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are monitored by the regulatory agencies and creditors respectively and therefore have 
less need for signaling through specialist auditors. We expect the associations of these 
two variables with the probability of specialist auditor choice to be negative.   
 
We compute the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) for each country from the first stage 
regression. The reason for using country-specific first stage models is that the 
country-wide legal, extra-legal and political variables could be relevant in the choice 
of specialists. This would get reflected in the specialist choice models in different 
countries. In accordance with Heckman (1976), we re-estimate model (2) with IMR as 
an additional country-specific independent variable in the second stage. The 
coefficients in the first stage are generally consistent with our expectations for each 
country. The large chi-squared statistic indicates that the model is significant.  
 
The results for the second stage regression are reported in Table 8. The interactions 
between legal, extra-legal, and political variables with the specialization variable are 
all statistically significant in the predicted direction in the corresponding regressions. 
Hence our main results are not likely to be driven by the endogeneity between auditor 
choice and firms’ characteristics. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
United States, United Kingdom and Australia Samples  
Given that firms in the United Kingdom constitute 42% of the total sample, and that 
UK might represent a country with far more effective institutions than other countries, 
we excluded UK firms in a sensitivity test. The untabulated results indicate that the 
interaction between specialization variable and legal variables (RULE, EFF, LEG) are 
all negative and significant at 1% level. Further, the interaction between 
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specialization variable and extra-legal variables (COMP, NEWS, and ELEG) are also 
negative and significant at 1% level. The interaction between specialization and tax 
compliance is not significant. For the set of political variables (RISKEXP, SOE, COE, 
and POLITICAL), the interaction with specialization variable are all positive and 
significant at 1% level. Overall, our results are not affected by the exclusion of the 
U.K. firms in our analysis. Further, we also deleted Australian firms but the results 
continued to hold. 
 
Our argument of specialist auditors substituting for the weaknesses in corporate 
governance, legal and extra-legal, and political institutions implies that when these 
institutions are stronger as in the US, the fee premium for specialist auditors is 
correspondingly reduced. To address this issue, we included data consisting of both 
US and non-US firms from Global Vantage database and conducted two sets of tests. 
The first set focuses only on 9, 831 US firms from 2000-2004 (the audit fee data for 
US is available only from year 2000 onwards). The second set includes US data from 
2000-2004 and other countries’ data from 1993-2004.  As noted in footnote 1, we 
present this only as an additional analysis because US audit fee data is available only 
for the post-2000 period and this data spans the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
with significant effects on the audit process and audit fees. This might impair the 
interpretability of the results which include the US data.    
[Insert Table 9 here] 
    The first column in Table 9 gives the results of regression using only US data. As 
expected, the main variable of interest SPEC is not significant, supporting our 
argument that specialist auditors and institutions are substitute mechanisms in 
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improving the assurance in financial reporting. 16 The remaining columns in Table 9 
provide the results of regressions using both US and non-US data. The results indicate 
that the interaction between specialization variable and legal variables (RULE and 
EFF) are negatively significant at 1% level. Further, the interaction between 
specialization variable and extra-legal variables (COMP and NEWS) are also negative 
and significant at 1% level. However, the interaction between specialization and tax 
compliance is significant only at 5% level. For the proxies of political variables 
(RISKEXP, SOE, and COE) the interactions with specialization variable are all 
positive and significant at 1% level. Further, we also carried out tests on the sample 
of firms that included both UK and US firms in addition to all other countries with 
data from 2000-2004. The (untabulated) results of this analysis also provide evidence 
supporting substitutive relationship between specialist auditors and legal, extra-legal 
and political institutions.  
Other robustness tests 
The specialist auditors in France did not often belong to the big-4 and could have 
distorted the results. Our results did not change when we removed France from the 
sample. In order to ensure that our results are not driven by some countries, we also 
used weighted least squares with wihte-adjusted heteroskedasticity-consistent 
coefficient variance but the results were robust to this specification.  
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we examined the relationship between the roles of country-wide legal, 
extra-legal and political institutions on the one hand, and the role of auditors on the 
other hand, in imparting credibility to reported financial statements. We first provide 
                                                 
16  We also conducted a similar test using UK data and found that the SPEC is not significant in UK as 
well.  
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evidence of the existence of specialist premium in our sample of non-US firms. We 
use the specialist premium as the variable to examine the effect of country-wide 
institutional variables on firm-level audit fees. The institutional variables have a 
general effect on the reporting environment in the country but the auditor has an 
effect on a particular client firm’s reporting. We show, consistent with the prior 
literature that when these institutions are effective, they increase the threshold of 
verification by the average auditor, and consequently, the average audit fee. Then, 
we use the specialist audit fee premium to examine whether specialist auditors 
substitute or complement the effects of these institutions. We show a decrease in 
specialist auditor premium when the institutions are stronger and the reporting 
environment is better, a finding that supports the substitution argument. Our findings 
imply that the demand for incremental assurance by specialist auditors is reduced by 
a stronger reporting environment resulting from effective legal, extra-legal and 
political institutions. These findings are inconsistent with the view that stronger 
institutions and better reporting environment increase the value of specialist 
knowledge in auditing and thereby increase the specialist premium.  
 
An implication of these findings is that when the supporting governance, legal, 
extra-legal and political institutions are stronger, the overall reporting environment 
becomes better and the credibility of reported financial statements, audited by even 
non-specialist auditors is improved. The firms do not need to seek out specialist 
auditors at a high premium to signal the credibility of their reports.  Furthermore, the 
findings imply that analysts and investors who conduct cross-country comparisons of 
financial statements need to consider the effectiveness of supporting legal, extra-
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legal and political institutions in each country in conjunction with whether the audit 
of the financial statement is carried out by a specialist auditor or not.  
 
There are three limitations that arise from data availability that warrant mention here. 
First, audit fee data on global vantage is limited to a few countries which could 
compromise the representativeness of the countries studied here. We do not however, 
have any reason to believe that the inclusion of other countries would alter our 
results here. The second limitation is the non-availability of governance data on 
boards in various countries. Anderson et al. (1993) argue that firms might use 
governance and auditing as substitutes depending on the context. For example, in 
firms with high investment opportunity set, accounting data is less reliable and 
therefore, governance could be better mechanism for limiting the agency costs and 
improving the reporting quality. On the other hand, in firms with more assets-in-
place, auditing might be a better mechanism for quality control. Our analysis of the 
effect of institutions on audit fees and specialist audit fee premium assumes that 
auditing is the pre-eminent assurance device at firm level.  The third limitation is our 
use of national industry-specialists. There is some evidence to show that the 
specialist premium is more evident at the city level rather than at the firm level 
(Ferguson et al. 2003; Francis et al. 2005). However, the fee data is not available at 
the city level for most of the countries in the sample.  
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Exhibit 1:  Definitions of variables  
 
Firm-specific variables 
LFEE = Log of audit fees, expressed in thousands of US$. 
SIZE = Log of assets, expressed in millions of US$. 
SPEC = Auditor specialization based on number of clients audited. Coded as 1 if 
the auditor has the largest market share in the industry. 
INVREC = Sum of inventories and receivables, divided by total assets. 
OPIN = 1 for unqualified audit opinion, and 0 otherwise. 
LOSS =  1 if firm is reporting a loss, 0 otherwise. 
LEV = Total liabilities divided by total assets. 
QUICK = Current assets minus inventories, divided by current liabilities. 
ROA = Returns on assets. 
FOREIGN =  1 if foreign income tax is greater than zero, 0 otherwise. 
DISCOP = 1 if the firm reports discontinued operations, 0 otherwise.  
CROSS = 1 if the cross list in the US, 0 otherwise. 
UTILITY = 1 if the firm is in utility industry, 0 otherwise. 
TENURE = Auditor tenure in years. 
   
Legal variables 
RULE =  Rule of law index as reported in La Porta et al. (1998). It is the 
assessment of the law and order tradition in the country produced by the 
country risk rating agency International Country Risk (ICR). Scale from 
zero to 10, with higher scores for greater tradition for law and order.  
EFF = Efficiency of Judicial system reported in La Porta et al. (1998). It is the 
assessment of the ‘efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it 
affects business, particularly foreign firms’ produced by the country risk 
rating agency Business International Corp. It ‘may be taken to represent 
investors’ assessment of conditions in the country in questions.’ Scale 
from zero to 10, with higher scores for higher efficiency levels. 
LEG = Principal component extracted from RULE, and EFF. 
   
Extra-legal variables 
COMP =  The effectiveness of product market competition reported in Dyck and 
Zingales (2004). Higher scores suggest general agreement that product 
market competition is effective. 
NEWS = The circulation of daily newspapers divided by population, as reported 
in Dyck and Zingales (2004) 
TAX =  The rate of tax compliance measure from Dyck and Zingales (2004) 
ELEG = Principal component extracted from COMP, NEWSPAPER, and TAX. 
   
Political variables 
RISKEXP =  Risk of expropriation by government reported in La Porta et al. (1998). 
Computed according to International Country Risk Guide’s assessment 
of the risk of ‘outright confiscation’ or ‘forced nationalization’. The 
higher the score, the greater the risk of expropriation  
SOE = Mean score for state ownership for the period 1993-2004, as computed 
in Bushman et al. (2004). The original source of data is from Economic 
Freedom of the World: 2005 Annual report. 1995 scores are used for the 
1993-1995 period and 2000 scores are used for the 1996-2000 period. 
The higher the SOE investment, the higher the rating. 
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COE =  A linear combination of three measures of the cost of entry into a 
country’s market from Djankov et al. (2002) (i) number of steps with 
which a start-up has to comply to obtain legal status; (ii) time it takes to 
become operational; and (iii) cost of becoming operational as a share of 
per capital GNP, constructed with principal components factor analysis 
as in Busman et al. (2004) 
POLITICAL = Principal component extracted from RISKEXP, SOE, and COE. 
   
Country control variables 
LCIFAR = Log of CIFAR disclosure index. CIFAR creates a country-specific index 
by rating the annual reports of at least three firms in every country for 
inclusion or omission of 90 specific items. The 90 items include specific 
disclosures in the following seven categories: general information (8 
items), income statement (11 items), balance sheet (14 items), funds 
flow statement (5 items), accounting policy disclosure (20 items), 
shareholders’ information (20 items), and other supplementary 
information (12 items). Each country is given a score ranging from zero 
to 90, with higher scores indicating more disclosure. 
SMDEV = Stock market development measured by stock market capitalization 
divided by GDP. The data are obtained from Beck et al. (2000).  
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Table 1:  Sample Distribution 
Country N Percent  Year N Percent  Industry N Percent 
Australia         
          
          
       
          
       
          
          
       
          
          
       
       
         
2263 11.06  1993 598 2.92  AGR 335 1.64
Denmark 597 2.92  1994 771 3.77 CHE 327 1.60
France 136 0.66  1995 941 4.60 COM 1952 9.54
Hong Kong 632 3.09  1996 1428 6.98 DUR 4735 23.14
Malaysia 3446 16.84  1997 1884 9.21 EXT 489 2.39
New Zealand 108 0.53  1998 1999 9.77 FOO 961 4.70
Norway 677 3.31  1999 2179 10.65 MIN 1852 9.05
Singapore 2353 11.50  2000 2198 10.74 PHA 273 1.33
South Africa 483 2.36  2001 2158 10.55 RET 3036 14.84
Spain 97 0.47  2002 2135 10.44 SER 2522 12.33
Sweden 1073 5.24  2003 2098 10.25 TEX 1950 9.53
United kingdom 
 
8594 42.01 
 
 2004 2070 10.12 TRA
 
1676 8.19
 UTI 351 1.72
Total 20459 100.00  20459 100.00 20459 100.00
The samp sists of ,459 firm ears for 12 countries over the perio  1993-2004 e samp ly includ firms aud  by  N audito llowing 
Frankel et al. (2002), industry membership is determined by the SIC code as follows: agriculture (AGR, 0100–0999), mining & construction (MIN, 1000–1999, 
excluding 1300–1399), food (FOO, 2000–2111), textiles & printing/publishing (TEX, 2200–2799), chemicals (CHE, 2800–2824, 2840–2899), pharmaceuticals 
(PHA, 2830–2836), extractive (EXT, 2900–2999, 1300–1399), durable manufacturers (DUR, 3000–3999, excluding 3570–3579 and 3670–3679), transportation 
(TRA, 4000–4899), utilities (UTI, 4900–4999), retail (RET, 5000–5999), services (SER, 7000–8999, excluding 7370–7379), computers (COM, 3570–3579, 
3670–3679, 7370–7379). 
le con 20 -y d . Th le on es ited Big rs. Fo
Panel B: Distribution of firms by industry and country 
 Australia Denmark France Hong Kong Malaysia New Zealand Norway Singapore South Africa Spain Sweden United Kingdom 
AGR 29 -   
             
             
            
            
             
             
             
             
           
             
             
             
-  - 257  - - - - - - 49 
CHE - - 2 - 96 - - - - - - 229
COM 97 34 34 - 133 - 127 352 41 - 291 854
DUR 354 226 25 164 1062 - 177 563 90 44 296 1750
EXT 177 - - - - - 66 - - - - 246
FOO 145 54 2 - 301 - - 102 18 3 - 339
MIN 545 - 12 - 335 - - 168 189 10 61 532
PHA 42 - 5 - - - - - - - - 226
RET 220 104 17 195 331 23 - 441 138 - 93 1476
SER 323 32 18 20 264 - 35 346 7 15 138 1326
TEX 113 95 9 104 434 17 66 145 - 30 131 810
TRA 184 64 15 149 171 68 206 236 - 3 81 502
UTI 34 - - - 62 - - - - 1 - 255
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Legal, Extra-legal and Political variables  
Country  RULE EFF COMP NEWS        TAX RISKEXP SOE COE LEG ELEG POLITICAL CIFAR SMDEV
Australia    10 10 5.52 3 4.58 0.73 0.75 -1.07 0.76 0.51 -1.01 80 0.58
Denmark      
      
       
      
         
     
     
10 10
 
 5.16 3.1 3.7 0.33 2.00 -0.61 0.76 -0.29 -0.67 75 0.35
France 8.98 8 5.83 2.2 3.86 0.35 6.00 1.57 -0.27 0.39 1.10 78 0.75
Hong Kong 8.22 10 5.85 8 4.56 1.71 0.00 -0.51 0.19 1.85 -0.63 73 2.48 
Malaysia 6.78 9 4.84 1.6 4.34 2.05 7.33 1.15 -0.62 -0.67 1.61 79 2.34
New Zealand 10 10 5.4 2.2 5 0.31 0.00 -1.03 0.76 0.40 -1.25 80 0.51 
Norway 10 10 4.96 5.9 3.96 0.12 4.83 -0.50 0.76 0.13 -0.15 75 0.19
Singapore 8.57 10 5.21 3.2 5.05 0.7 2.00 0.18 0.30 0.39 -0.20 79 1.55
South Africa 4.42 6 4.89 0.34 2.4 3.12 5.50 0.29 -2.42 -1.72 1.15 79 1.06 
Spain 7.8 6.25 5.07 1 1.91 0.48 6.00 1.78 -1.26 -1.60 1.23 72 0.71
Sweden 10 10 5.08 4.5 3.39 0.6 3.33 -0.48 0.76 -0.25 -0.29 83 1.30
United Kingdom 8.57 10 5.74 3.3 4.67 0.29 1.33 -0.78 0.30 0.86 -0.89 85 1.08 
 
Panel B: Mean firm level variables over the sample period  
Country     LFEE SPEC SIZE INVREC OPIN        LOSS LEV QUICK ROA FOREIGN DISCOP CROSS UTILITY TENURE
Australia         
               
              
               
              
               
              
               
               
              
               
              
5.43 0.18 5.06 0.24 0.94 0.29 0.50 2.21 -0.04  0.01 0.00 0.04 0.24 5.24 
Denmark
 
5.32 0.43 4.91 0.42 0.99 0.21 0.57 1.40 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.00 3.79
France 6.92 0.01 6.54 0.38 0.67 0.31 0.70 1.29 -0.04 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.09 3.29
Hong Kong
 
5.39 0.38 5.69 0.24 0.96 0.28 0.45 1.86 0.00 0.64 0.01 0.07 0.00 4.97
Malaysia 3.44 0.09 4.47 0.33 0.90 0.25 0.61 2.15 -0.01 0.20 0.02 0.00 0.10 4.53
New Zealand
 
5.29 0.21 5.43 0.23 1.00 0.15 0.53 0.91 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.00 4.73
Norway 4.99 0.37 4.80 0.27 0.97 0.36 0.57 1.80 -0.04 0.26 0.03 0.04 0.00 4.61
Singapore 4.64 0.36 4.54 0.33 0.90 0.25 0.49 1.50 0.00 0.26 0.01 0.00 0.07 4.51
South Africa
 
5.68 0.24 5.99 0.33 0.97 0.14 0.47 1.53 0.07 0.41 0.01 0.10 0.39 4.63
Spain 5.74 0.43 6.36 0.35 0.82 0.12 0.60 1.09 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.10 3.79
Sweden 5.46 0.34 4.49 0.34 0.99 0.42 0.51 2.04 -0.12 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.06 3.60
United Kingdom 6.08 0.29 5.38 0.36 0.99 0.24 0.57 1.53 -0.01 0.53 0.01 0.07 0.06 5.32
 
Table 3: The Effect of Legal Variables on Audit Fee and Specialization Premium 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Basic MEASURE = RULE MEASURE = EFF MEASURE = LEG 
Intercept -6.926 
(-5.88)*** 
-9.477 
(-9.97)*** 
-9.585 
(-10.34)*** 
-8.131 
(-6.29)*** 
-8.624 
(-6.31)*** 
-5.784 
(-7.97)*** 
-5.689 
(-8.03)*** 
SPEC 0.199 
(3.33)*** 
0.098 
(3.44)*** 
1.503 
(4.65)*** 
0.160 
(3.35)*** 
2.438 
(3.19)*** 
0.121 
(3.36)*** 
0.211 
(4.61)*** 
SIZE 0.652 
(55.53)*** 
0.644 
(58.38)*** 
0.642 
(59.45)*** 
0.658 
(52.31)*** 
0.657 
(52.35)*** 
0.653 
(54.94)*** 
0.651 
(55.54)*** 
INVREC 0.747 
(14.06)*** 
0.827 
(14.42)*** 
0.834 
(14.35)*** 
0.787 
(14.10)*** 
0.788 
(14.03)*** 
0.816 
(14.23)*** 
0.821 
(14.15)*** 
OPIN 0.179 
(2.90)*** 
0.053 
(1.10) 
0.061 
(1.27) 
0.132 
(2.22)** 
0.131 
(2.17)** 
0.082 
(1.49) 
0.087 
(1.57) 
LOSS 0.293 
(12.35)*** 
0.250 
(13.04)*** 
0.252 
(13.48)*** 
0.278 
(12.79)*** 
0.279 
(12.93)*** 
0.261 
(12.96)*** 
0.262 
(13.34)*** 
LEV 0.026 
(1.46) 
0.036 
(2.02)*** 
0.037 
(2.06)*** 
0.028 
(1.59) 
0.028 
(1.62) 
0.032 
(1.84)* 
0.033 
(1.89)* 
QUICK -0.008 
(-2.72)*** 
-0.007 
(-2.60)*** 
-0.007 
(-2.61)*** 
-0.007 
(-2.52)*** 
-0.007 
(-2.51)*** 
-0.007 
(-2.50)*** 
-0.007 
(-2.51)*** 
ROA -0.349 
(-9.04)*** 
-0.301 
(-8.45)*** 
-0.297 
(-8.22)*** 
-0.341 
(-9.04)*** 
-0.340 
(-8.95)*** 
-0.320 
(-8.76)*** 
-0.316 
(-8.51)*** 
FOREIGN 0.486 
(13.66)*** 
0.539 
(21.76)*** 
0.534 
(22.00)*** 
0.481 
(15.00)*** 
0.480 
(15.09)*** 
0.508 
(18.60)*** 
0.505 
(18.77)*** 
DISCOP 0.091 
(0.68) 
0.164 
(1.83)* 
0.170 
(1.94)* 
0.118 
(0.98) 
0.118 
(0.99) 
0.147 
(1.44) 
0.150 
(1.51) 
CROSS 0.369 
(6.80)*** 
0.354 
(7.35)*** 
0.363 
(7.39)*** 
0.374 
(6.91)*** 
0.381 
(6.88)*** 
0.365 
(7.20)*** 
0.375 
(7.21)*** 
UTILITY -0.394 
(-11.34)*** 
-0.285 
(-8.07)*** 
-0.282 
(-7.76)*** 
-0.308 
(-7.97)*** 
-0.300 
(-7.57)*** 
-0.276 
(-7.71)*** 
-0.271 
(-7.37)*** 
TENURE 0.002 
(0.47) 
0.001 
(0.47) 
0.002 
(0.53) 
-0.001 
(-0.04) 
0.001 
(0.03) 
0.001 
(0.03) 
0.001 
(0.12) 
LCIFAR 0.106 
(7.41)*** 
0.096 
(12.28)*** 
0.094 
(12.25)*** 
0.090 
(7.87)*** 
0.089 
(7.93)*** 
0.089 
(10.02)*** 
0.088 
(10.07)*** 
SMDEV -0.326 
(-3.04)*** 
0.019 
(0.26) 
0.008 
(0.12) 
-0.297 
(-3.30)*** 
-0.292 
(-3.29)*** 
-0.136 
(-1.76)* 
-0.139 
(-1.85)* 
MEASURE  0.360 
(6.39)*** 
0.390 
(7.00)*** 
0.260 
(2.94)*** 
0.316 
(3.11)*** 
0.553 
(4.42)*** 
0.626 
(4.79)*** 
SPEC* 
MEASURE 
  -0.162 
(-4.54)*** 
 -0.233 
(-3.08)*** 
 -0.353 
(-4.14)*** 
        
Adj R2 (%) 68.12 73.10 73.30 69.27 69.45 71.40 71.66 
N 20459 20459 20459 20459 20459 20459 20459 
 
*, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively 
The variable definitions and Models are given in the Exhibit. Model 2 is estimated both with and without the 
interaction term 
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Table 4: The Effect of Extra-Legal Variables on Audit Fee and Specialization Premium 
 Model 2 
 MEASURE = COMP MEASURE = NEWS MEASURE = TAX MEASURE = ELEG 
Intercept -7.326 
(-9.60)*** 
-8.019 
(-10.22)*** 
-8.812 
(-8.53)*** 
-8.699 
(-8.74)*** 
-6.868 
(-5.82)*** 
-7.014 
(-5.84)*** 
-3.321 
(-4.29)*** 
-3.352 
(-4.48)*** 
SPEC 0.114 
(4.09)*** 
2.847 
(5.03)*** 
0.089 
(2.86)*** 
0.521 
(4.62)*** 
0.200 
(3.33)*** 
0.673 
(2.47)** 
0.117 
(3.60)*** 
0.245 
(4.94)*** 
SIZE 0.623 
(69.26)*** 
0.624 
(70.32)*** 
0.646 
(55.97)*** 
0.647 
(56.53)*** 
0.650 
(56.14)*** 
0.649 
(55.75)*** 
0.644 
(61.31)*** 
0.644 
(62.51)*** 
INVREC 0.794 
(14.94)*** 
0.794 
(14.71)*** 
0.801 
(13.09)*** 
0.802 
(13.11)*** 
0.736 
(14.14)*** 
0.735 
(14.15)*** 
0.828 
(13.99)*** 
0.825 
(13.85)*** 
OPIN 0.079 
(1.73)* 
0.076 
(1.76)* 
0.003 
(0.05) 
0.002 
(0.04) 
0.171 
(2.78)*** 
0.171 
(2.77)*** 
0.095 
(1.91)* 
0.092 
(1.92)* 
LOSS 0.263 
(13.87)*** 
0.266 
(14.29)*** 
0.226 
(10.68)*** 
0.227 
(10.97)*** 
0.292 
(12.13)*** 
0.291 
(12.13)*** 
0.261 
(13.51)*** 
0.263 
(13.90)*** 
LEV 0.030 
(1.78)* 
0.031 
(1.83)* 
0.030 
(1.79)* 
0.031 
(1.83)* 
0.026 
(1.45) 
0.026 
(1.46) 
0.029 
(1.73)* 
0.031 
(1.79)* 
QUICK -0.007 
(-2.77)*** 
-0.007 
(-2.72)*** 
-0.007 
(-2.51)*** 
-0.007 
(-2.50)*** 
-0.008 
(-2.81)*** 
-0.008 
(-2.81)*** 
-0.006 
(-2.39)** 
-0.006 
(-2.36)** 
ROA -0.323 
(-7.66)*** 
-0.322 
(-7.65)*** 
-0.311 
(-9.21)*** 
-0.313 
(-9.22)*** 
-0.346 
(-9.16)*** 
-0.346 
(-9.17)*** 
-0.334 
(-8.42)*** 
-0.334 
(-8.41)*** 
FOREIGN 0.395 
(10.95)*** 
0.394 
(11.02)*** 
0.399 
(12.15)*** 
0.396 
(11.94)*** 
0.490 
(14.01)*** 
0.491 
(14.04)*** 
0.399 
(11.18)*** 
0.399 
(11.26)*** 
DISCOP 0.253 
(2.58)*** 
0.253 
(2.59)*** 
0.150 
(1.60) 
0.153 
(1.70)* 
0.084 
(0.63) 
0.082 
(0.61) 
0.210 
(2.11)** 
0.209 
(2.13)** 
CROSS 0.324 
(7.65)*** 
0.326 
(7.46)*** 
0.326 
(7.37)*** 
0.330 
(7.41)*** 
0.365 
(6.68)*** 
0.367 
(6.68)*** 
0.347 
(7.60)*** 
0.353 
(7.47)*** 
UTILITY -0.360 
(-11.89)*** 
-0.351 
(-11.61)*** 
-0.252 
(-7.25)*** 
-0.249 
(-7.10)*** 
-0.402 
(-10.67)*** 
-0.397 
(-10.45)*** 
-0.300 
(-8.78)*** 
-0.289 
(-8.33)*** 
TENURE -0.001 
(-.0.42) 
-0.002 
(-0.50) 
0.001 
(0.35) 
0.001 
(0.37) 
0.003 
(0.66) 
0.003 
(0.66) 
-0.003 
(-0.72) 
-0.003 
(-0.74) 
LCIFAR 0.021 
(1.76)* 
0.023 
(2.00)** 
0.123 
(10.53)*** 
0.120 
(10.71)*** 
0.110 
(7.69)*** 
0.109 
(7.72)*** 
0.064 
(6.68)*** 
0.064 
(6.89)*** 
SMDEV -0.437 
(-8.71)*** 
-0.415 
(-8.56)*** 
-0.417 
(-6.65)*** 
-0.402 
(-6.67)*** 
-0.312 
(-2.86)*** 
-0.310 
(-2.84)*** 
-0.456 
(-7.18)*** 
-0.430 
(-7.06)*** 
MEASURE 1.440 
(8.59)*** 
1.531 
(9.41)*** 
0.279 
(7.17)*** 
0.313 
(7.52)*** 
-0.069 
(-1.62) 
-0.036 
(-0.67) 
0.547 
(6.17)*** 
0.611 
(6.69)*** 
SPEC* 
MEASURE 
 -0.502 
(-4.97)*** 
 -0.128 
(-4.43)*** 
 -0.106 
(-1.91)* 
 -0.294 
(-5.02)*** 
         
Adj R2 (%) 73.84 74.03 72.33 72.52 68.16 68.19 72.12 72.38 
N 20459 20459 20459 20459 20459 20459 20459 20459 
 
*, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively 
The variable definitions and Models are given in the Exhibit. Model 2 is estimated both with and without the 
interaction term 
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Table 5: The Effect of Political Variables on Audit Fee and Specialization Premium 
 Model 2 
 MEASURE =RISKEXP MEASURE =SOE MEASURE =COE MEASURE 
=POLITICAL 
Intercept -1.460 
(-1.78) 
-1.533 
(-1.91)* 
-1.957 
(-2.96)*** 
-1.987 
(-3.05)*** 
-1.487 
(-2.97)*** 
-1.600 
(-3.23)*** 
-1.420 
(-2.76)*** 
-1.520 
(-2.96)*** 
SPEC 0.065 
(2.29)** 
-0.133 
(-3.04)*** 
0.051 
(2.64)*** 
-0.095 
(-2.90)*** 
0.069 
(3.42)*** 
0.137 
(3.59)*** 
0.040 
(2.28)** 
0.097 
(3.12)*** 
SIZE 0.642 
(61.55)*** 
0.640 
(62.94)*** 
0.634 
(61.64)*** 
0.634 
(61.58)*** 
0.633 
(48.98)*** 
0.633 
(49.39)*** 
0.633 
(58.40)*** 
0.633 
(58.52)*** 
INVREC 0.732 
(13.38)*** 
0.742 
(13.44)*** 
0.840 
(14.65)*** 
0.847 
(14.53)*** 
0.879 
(14.49)*** 
0.882 
(14.36)*** 
0.842 
(14.38)*** 
0.846 
(14.25)*** 
OPIN 0.097 
(2.33)** 
0.092 
(2.29)** 
0.009 
(0.17) 
0.007 
(0.14) 
-0.107 
(-2.07)** 
-0.105 
(-2.01)** 
-0.039 
(-0.81) 
-0.039 
(-0.79) 
LOSS 0.258 
(14.52)*** 
0.262 
(14.93)*** 
0.267 
(16.96)*** 
0.269 
(17.31)*** 
0.250 
(15.96)*** 
0.252 
(16.37)*** 
0.254 
(16.98)*** 
0.256 
(17.28)*** 
LEV 0.033 
(1.81)* 
0.034 
(1.95)** 
0.038 
(2.04)** 
0.039 
(2.06)** 
0.035 
(2.00)** 
0.036 
(2.02)** 
0.037 
(2.06)** 
0.038 
(2.08)** 
QUICK -0.006 
(-2.29)** 
-0.006 
(-2.27)** 
-0.005 
(-2.17)** 
-0.005 
(-2.18)** 
-0.006 
(-2.70)*** 
-0.006 
(-2.68)*** 
-0.005 
(-2.28)** 
-0.005 
(-2.27)** 
ROA -0.324 
(-9.25)*** 
-0.321 
(-9.09)*** 
-0.317 
(-8.17)*** 
-0.315 
(-8.08)*** 
-0.302 
(-7.91)*** 
-0.300 
(-7.79)*** 
-0.308 
(-8.20)*** 
-0.307 
(-8.12)*** 
FOREIGN 0.440 
(12.74)*** 
0.437 
(12.82)*** 
0.441 
(14.68)*** 
0.439 
(14.75)*** 
0.440 
(16.02)*** 
0.437 
(15.93)*** 
0.434 
(15.12)*** 
0.432 
(15.08)*** 
DISCOP 0.144 
(1.75)* 
0.149 
(1.86)* 
0.286 
(3.12)*** 
0.284 
(3.12)*** 
0.201 
(2.58)*** 
0.205 
(2.64)*** 
0.247 
(3.13)*** 
0.248 
(3.16)*** 
CROSS 0.358 
(7.43)*** 
0.365 
(7.34)*** 
0.328 
(7.30)*** 
0.331 
(7.26)*** 
0.289 
(6.68)*** 
0.294 
(6.70)*** 
0.314 
(7.17)*** 
0.318 
(7.16)*** 
UTILITY -0.208 
(-6.34)*** 
-0.203 
(-6.16)*** 
-0.387 
(-12.71)*** 
-0.381 
(-12.52)*** 
-0.409 
(-13.67)*** 
-0.407 
(-13.54)*** 
-0.351 
(-11.67)*** 
-0.348 
(-11.51)*** 
TENURE 0.002 
(0.51) 
0.002 
(0.58) 
-0.002 
(-0.52) 
-0.002 
(-0.52) 
-0.001 
(-0.44) 
-0.001 
(-0.48) 
-0.001 
(-0.43) 
-0.001 
(-0.43) 
LCIFAR 0.043 
(4.30)*** 
0.044 
(4.56)*** 
0.055 
(6.94)*** 
0.056 
(7.12)*** 
0.038 
(6.08)*** 
0.040 
(6.38)*** 
0.038 
(5.98)*** 
0.039 
(6.18)*** 
SMDEV -0.028 
(-0.39) 
-0.042 
(-0.60) 
-0.304 
(-6.52)*** 
-0.292 
(-6.37)*** 
-0.116 
(-2.68)*** 
-0.116 
(-2.70)*** 
-0.161 
(-4.55)*** 
-0.159 
(-4.50)*** 
MEASURE -0.638 
(-6.53)*** 
-0.685 
(-7.29)*** 
-0.208 
(-15.08)*** 
-0.217 
(-16.32)*** 
-0.697 
(-12.52)*** 
-0.718 
(-12.67)*** 
-0.576 
(-17.83)*** 
-0.590 
(-18.76)*** 
SPEC* 
MEASURE 
 0.297 
(4.74)*** 
 0.065 
(3.79)*** 
 0.164 
(2.88)*** 
 0.125 
(3.24)*** 
         
Adj R2 (%) 72.86 73.11 75.08 75.18 75.22 75.30 75.61 75.66 
N 20459 20459 20459 20459 20459 20459 20459 20459 
 
*, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively 
The variable definitions and Models are given in the Exhibit. Model 2 is estimated both with and without the 
interaction term 
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Table 6: Effects of Country-wide Governance Variables on Audit Fee and Specialization Premium 
 
 Model 2 
 MEASURE =OWN MEASURE =ANTIDIR MEASURE =GOVN 
Intercept 2.641 
(2.49)** 
2.164 
(2.14)** 
-6.585 
(-5.53)*** 
-6.697 
(-5.54)*** 
-2.738 
(-3.57)*** 
-2.726 
(-3.71)*** 
SPEC 0.142 
(3.68)*** 
0.939 
(5.13)*** 
0.200 
(3.34)*** 
0.622 
(2.13)** 
0.155 
(3.47)*** 
0.194 
(4.47)*** 
SIZE 0.624 
(63.77)*** 
0.625 
(65.75)*** 
0.651 
(55.19)*** 
0.652 
(55.25)*** 
0.635 
(61.70)*** 
0.634 
(64.26)*** 
INVREC 0.762 
(15.32)*** 
0.760 
(14.98)*** 
0.757 
(14.26)*** 
0.755 
(14.14)*** 
0.682 
(14.35)*** 
0.689 
(14.45)*** 
OPIN 0.012 
(0.27) 
0.009 
(0.20) 
0.177 
(2.82)*** 
0.170 
(2.77)*** 
0.077 
(1.69)* 
0.082 
(1.89)* 
LOSS 0.246 
(12.94)*** 
0.249 
(13.36)*** 
0.294 
(12.45)*** 
0.294 
(12.47)*** 
0.257 
(11.43)*** 
0.259 
(11.84)*** 
LEV 0.027 
(1.67)* 
0.028 
(1.73)* 
0.026 
(1.44) 
0.026 
(1.44) 
0.030 
(1.73)* 
0.031 
(1.80)* 
QUICK -0.009 
(-3.41)*** 
-0.009 
(-3.33)*** 
-0.008 
(-2.70)*** 
-0.008 
(-2.68)*** 
-0.009 
(-3.32)*** 
-0.009 
(-3.28)*** 
ROA -0.306 
(-8.02)*** 
-0.302 
(-7.93)*** 
-0.351 
(-8.99)*** 
-0.352 
(-9.03)*** 
-0.301 
(-8.41)*** 
-0.293 
(-8.15)*** 
FOREIGN 0.424 
(11.99)*** 
0.419 
(11.99)*** 
0.470 
(15.72)*** 
0.468 
(15.86)*** 
0.559 
(17.37)*** 
0.553 
(17.82)*** 
DISCOP 0.096 
(1.09) 
0.106 
(1.23) 
0.094 
(0.71) 
0.094 
(0.71) 
0.071 
(0.65) 
0.087 
(0.82) 
CROSS 0.303 
(7.07)*** 
0.306 
(6.91)*** 
0.367 
(6.93)*** 
0.366 
(6.87)*** 
0.343 
(7.10)*** 
0.346 
(7.06)*** 
UTILITY -0.334 
(-11.92)*** 
-0.327 
(-11.57)*** 
-0.401 
(-11.56)*** 
-0.400 
(-11.49)*** 
-0.303 
(-9.65)*** 
-0.297 
(-9.42)*** 
TENURE 0.001 
(0.40) 
0.001 
(0.32) 
0.001 
(0.35) 
0.001 
(0.26) 
0.006 
(1.55) 
0.006 
(1.69)* 
LCIFAR -0.047 
(-2.65)*** 
-0.043 
(-2.56)*** 
0.100 
(6.36)*** 
0.099 
(6.38)*** 
0.050 
(4.76)*** 
0.049 
(4.98)*** 
SMDEV -0.056 
(-0.93) 
-0.057 
(-0.99) 
-0.355 
(-3.16)*** 
-0.353 
(-3.16)*** 
0.085 
(0.79) 
0.079 
(0.77) 
MEASURE 4.229 
(7.39)*** 
4.448 
(7.95)*** 
0.062 
(0.81) 
0.095 
(1.09) 
0.643 
(6.14)*** 
0.740 
(6.72)*** 
SPEC* 
MEASURE 
 -1.146 
(-4.98)*** 
 -0.097 
(-1.69)* 
 -0.351 
(-5.17)*** 
       
Adj R2 (%) 72.91 73.14 68.16 68.19 71.24 71.64 
N 20459 20459 20459 20459 20459 20459 
 
*, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively 
The variable definitions and Models are given in the Exhibit. Model 2 is estimated both with and without the 
interaction term 
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Table 7:  Incremental Effects of Legal and Extra-Legal variables over Governance 
  Expanded Model 2 that includes 
Governance and Legal Variables 
Expanded Model 2 that includes 
Governance, Legal and Extra-
legal Variables 
Intercept α0 -3.556 
(-4.93)*** 
0.749 
(1.03) 
SPEC α1 0.209 
(4.79)*** 
0.226 
(5.19)*** 
SIZE α2 0.640 
(63.67)*** 
0.624 
(73.49)*** 
INVREC α3 0.755 
(14.64)*** 
0.734 
(14.81)*** 
OPIN α4 0.063 
(1.35) 
0.042 
(1.02) 
LOSS α5 0.258 
(12.54)*** 
0.242 
(14.09)*** 
LEV α6 0.033 
(1.93)* 
0.031 
(1.88)* 
QUICK α7 -0.008 
(-2.98)*** 
-0.008 
(-3.10)*** 
ROA α8 -0.296 
(-8.27)*** 
-0.299 
(-8.20)*** 
FOREIGN α9 0.540 
(21.06)*** 
0.440 
(15.78)*** 
DISCOP α10 0.122 
(1.28) 
0.179 
(2.06)** 
CROSS α11 0.359 
(7.12)*** 
0.327 
(7.36)*** 
UTILITY α12 -0.260 
(-7.46)*** 
-0.259 
(-8.63)*** 
TENURE α13 0.004 
(1.11) 
0.002 
(0.61) 
LCIFAR α14 0.060 
(6.38)*** 
0.011 
(1.19) 
SMDEV α15 0.039 
(0.47) 
-0.176 
(-2.57)*** 
GOVN α16 0.443 
(5.57)*** 
0.674 
(8.00)*** 
SPEC* 
GOVN 
α17 -0.155 
(-2.73)*** 
-0.112 
(-2.24)** 
LEG α18 0.389 
(2.92)*** 
-0.335 
(-2.23)** 
SPEC*LEG α19 -0.263 
(-2.72)*** 
-0.102 
(-1.22) 
ELEG α20  0.677 
(7.68)*** 
SPEC*ELEG α21  -0.179 
(-3.81)*** 
    
Adj R2 (%)  72.41 74.16 
N  20459 20459 
*, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively 
The variable definitions and the Model are given in the Exhibit.  
TABLE 8 
Endogeneity of Auditor Choice and Firms’ Characteristics: Two-Stage Least Squares (Second Stage results) 
 Legal variables Extra-legal variables Political variables 
MEASURE = RULE  EFF LEG       COMP NEWS TAX ELEG RISKEXP SOE COE POLITICAL
Intercept  -9.805
(-10.37)*** 
-8.969 
(-6.16)*** 
-5.799 
(-8.35)*** 
-7.811 
(-10.11)*** 
-8.888 
(-8.79)*** 
-6.929 
(-5.90)*** 
-3.326 
(-4.40)*** 
-1.544 
(-1.89)* 
-2.020 
(-3.08)*** 
-1.417 
(-2.78)*** 
-1.509 
(-2.93)*** 
SPEC 1.581 
(4.70)*** 
2.812 
(3.18)*** 
0.227 
(4.83)*** 
2.785 
(4.94)*** 
0.550 
(4.74)*** 
0.599 
(2.22)** 
2.249 
(4.88)*** 
-0.135 
(-3.39)*** 
-0.111 
(-3.19)*** 
0.182 
(4.83)*** 
0.124 
(3.91)*** 
SIZE 0.641 
(53.98)*** 
0.659 
(47.49)*** 
0.651 
(51.25)*** 
0.626 
(63.15)*** 
0.648 
(52.74)*** 
0.652 
(47.38)*** 
0.646 
(55.66)*** 
0.643 
(56.39)*** 
0.627 
(67.92)*** 
0.622 
(59.59)*** 
0.626 
(65.17)*** 
INVREC 0.799 
(11.85)*** 
0.772 
(11.29)*** 
0.797 
(11.57)*** 
0.758 
(12.48)*** 
0.775 
(11.21)*** 
0.708 
(11.61)*** 
0.803 
(11.53)*** 
0.718 
(11.28)*** 
0.773 
(12.92)*** 
0.797 
(12.85)*** 
0.773 
(12.69)*** 
OPIN 0.116 
(2.65)*** 
0.204 
(4.03)*** 
0.156 
(3.33)*** 
0.077 
(1.65)* 
0.072 
(1.50) 
0.206 
(3.61)*** 
0.135 
(2.86)*** 
0.144 
(3.69)*** 
0.090 
(2.48)** 
-0.020 
(-0.55) 
0.045 
(1.34) 
LOSS 0.257 
(12.67)*** 
0.275 
(11.52)*** 
0.263 
(12.20)*** 
0.271 
(13.86)*** 
0.225 
(9.74)*** 
0.282 
(10.88)*** 
0.265 
(12.78)*** 
0.264 
(13.79)*** 
0.269 
(15.48)*** 
0.249 
(14.52)*** 
0.257 
(15.48)*** 
LEV 0.111 
(2.40)** 
0.087 
(1.76)* 
0.100 
(2.11)** 
0.090 
(2.19)** 
0.091 
(2.02)** 
0.086 
(1.69)* 
0.088 
(2.01)** 
0.098 
(2.25)** 
0.101 
(2.26)** 
0.091 
(2.09)** 
0.098 
(2.26)** 
QUICK  -0.005
(-1.44) 
-0.006 
(-1.67)* 
-0.005 
(-1.48) 
-0.005 
(-1.65)* 
-0.006 
(-1.73)* 
-0.008 
(-2.10)** 
-0.005 
(-1.45) 
-0.004 
(-1.37) 
-0.003 
(-1.12) 
-0.004 
(-1.59) 
-0.003 
(-1.16) 
ROA -0.297 
(-7.52)*** 
-0.357 
(-8.28)*** 
-0.324 
(-7.99)*** 
-0.337 
(-7.43)*** 
-0.319 
(-8.51)*** 
-0.360 
(-8.03)*** 
-0.351 
(-8.13)*** 
-0.332 
(-8.64)*** 
-0.317 
(-7.79)*** 
-0.295 
(-7.57)*** 
-0.307 
(-7.84)*** 
FOREIGN  0.537
(22.87)*** 
0.478 
(15.45)*** 
0.507 
(19.72)*** 
0.384 
(10.58)*** 
0.393 
(11.95)*** 
0.482 
(13.97)*** 
0.394 
(11.15)*** 
0.432 
(12.79)*** 
0.444 
(14.88)*** 
0.446 
(16.52)*** 
0.438 
(15.52)*** 
DISCOP 0.156 
(1.65)* 
0.098 
(0.76) 
0.137 
(1.26) 
0.228 
(2.19)** 
0.152 
(1.54) 
0.051 
(0.35) 
0.188 
(1.75)* 
0.140 
(1.60) 
0.269 
(2.74)*** 
0.206 
(2.51)*** 
0.240 
(2835)*** 
CROSS  0.365
(7.67)*** 
0.385 
(7.36)*** 
0.375 
(7.55)*** 
0.342 
(8.13)*** 
0.337 
(7.98)*** 
0.381 
(7.25)*** 
0.359 
(7.93)*** 
0.365 
(7.60)*** 
0.345 
(7.91)*** 
0.309 
(7.45)*** 
0.330 
(7.77)*** 
UTILITY  -0.273
(-7.96)*** 
-0.293 
(-9.17)*** 
-0.266 
(-8.10)*** 
-0.319 
(-10.72)*** 
-0.238 
(-7.47)*** 
-0.370 
(-12.18)*** 
-0.283 
(-8.60)*** 
-0.204 
(-6.63)*** 
-0.334 
(-11.46)*** 
-0.345 
(-12..17)*** 
-0.302 
(-10..23)*** 
TENURE  0.002
(0.50) 
-0.001 
(-0.12) 
0.001 
(0.05) 
-0.003 
(-0.84) 
0.001 
(0.16) 
0.002 
(0.41) 
-0.004 
(-0.98) 
0.001 
(0.35) 
-0.002 
(-0.55) 
-0.001 
(-0.42) 
-0.001 
(-0.41) 
LCIFAR  0.094
(12.37)*** 
0.087 
(7.90)*** 
0.087 
(10.20)*** 
0.020 
(1.72)* 
0.121 
(10.58)*** 
0.110 
(7.90)*** 
0.063 
(6.69)*** 
0.043 
(4.41)*** 
0.055 
(6.95)*** 
0.035 
(5.56)*** 
0.037 
(5.80)*** 
SMDEV 0.015 
(0.22) 
-0.288 
(-3.26)*** 
-0.130 
(-1.72)* 
-0.426 
(-8.70)*** 
-0.403 
(-6.71)*** 
-0.306 
(-2.78)*** 
-0.435 
(-7.00)*** 
-0.043 
(-0.61) 
-0.281 
(-6.37)*** 
-0.082 
(-2.49)*** 
-0.142 
(-4.57)*** 
MEASURE  0.406
(6.91)*** 
0.342 
(2.88)*** 
0.668 
(4.61)*** 
1.543 
(9.39)*** 
0.324 
(7.52)*** 
-0.071 
(-1.35) 
0.616 
(6.53)*** 
-0.694 
(-7.16)*** 
-0.230 
(-18.18)*** 
-0.808 
(-19.53)*** 
-0.631 
(-22.09)*** 
SPEC* 
MEASURE 
-0.171 
(-4.60)*** 
-0.270 
(-3.07)*** 
-0.391 
(-4.14)*** 
-0.493 
(-4.89)*** 
-0.134 
(-4.45)*** 
-0.093 
(-1.64)* 
-0.298 
(-4.93)*** 
0.305 
(4.67)*** 
0.078 
(4.25)*** 
0.234 
(4.24)*** 
0.157 
(3.85)*** 
IMR 0.017 
(0.84) 
0.020 
(0.55) 
0.026 
(0.97) 
-0.029 
(-1.57) 
0.031 
(1.56) 
-0.019 
(-0.46) 
0.001 
(0.03) 
0.010 
(0.70) 
0.061 
(5.24)*** 
0.094 
(6.92)*** 
0.071 
(7.30)*** 
Adj R2 (%)             73.17 69.15 71.50 73.86 72.37 67.91 72.10 72.86 75.37 75.99 75.96
N 19762           19762 19762 19762 19762 19762 19762 19762 19762 19762 19762
*, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively 
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Table 9 
Regression results showing specialist fee premium in USA and other countries  
 
 
 USA only All countries including USA  
    Legal variables Extra-legal variables Political variables 
         RULE EFF COMP NEWS TAX RISKEXP SOE COE
Intercept α0 2.836 
(21.73)*** 
-9.03 
(-8.05) *** 
-6.621 
(-4.34) *** 
-8.817 
(-9.35)*** 
-3.517 
(-2.34)**        
-3.602 
(-2.68)***        
-1.883 
(-1.88)*         
-1.429 
(-1.43)          
4.537 
(-5.39)***        
SPEC α1 0.016 
(1.18) 
1.363 
(4.75) *** 
2.814 
(3.24) 
2.562 
   (4.94)  ***    
0.460 
(3.51)***    
0.620 
(2.39)**         
-0.076 
(-3.04)***    
-0.077 
(-3.14)***        
0.209 
(4.32)***        
SIZE α2 0.484 
(59.42)*** 
0.595 
(35.07) *** 
0.618 
(32.91) *** 
0.575 
(38.55)***   
0.626 
(35.34)***       
0.621 
(33.26)***       
0.588 
(35.14)***        
0.586 
(36.18)***       
0.578 
(35.58)***       
INVREC α3 0.628 
(5.92) *** 
0.788 
(15.28) *** 
0.758 
(14.75) *** 
0.757  
(15.74)***      
0.738 
(13.25)***       
0.716 
(14.63)***       
0.717 
(14.20)***        
0.802 
(15.25)***       
0.800 
(15.74)***       
OPIN α4 -0.205 
(-1.98) 
-0.117 
(-3.06) *** 
-0.167 
(-6.14) *** 
0.013 
(0.23)        
-0.290 
(-6.17)***        
-0.202 
(-6.35)***       
-0.062 
(-1.23)          
-0.096 
(-2.74)***       
-0.017 
(-0.28)         
LOSS α5 0.218 
(4.34)*** 
0.266 
(10.09) *** 
0.301 
(11.52) *** 
0.267 
(9.50)***   
0.305 
(12.68)***       
0.322 
(11.84)***       
0.268 
(10.05)***        
0.280 
(10.72)***       
0.261 
(9.45)***        
LEV α6 0.018 
(2.05) 
0.017 
(2.68) *** 
0.006 
(0.91) 
0.015  
(2.40)**  
0.002 
(0.30)          
0.001 
(0.09)          
0.015 
(2.46)**          
0.018 
(2.85)***        
0.018 
(2.94)***        
QUICK α7 -0.017 
(-3.20)** 
-0.011 
(-4.97) *** 
-0.008 
(-3.98) *** 
-0.013 
(-5.70)***      
-0.006 
(-2.94)***        
-0.008 
(-3.82)***        
-0.011 
(-5.03)***        
-0.010 
(-4.64)***       
-0.013 
(-5.86)***        
ROA α8 -0.044 
(-1.03) 
-0.132 
(-3.10) *** 
-0.169 
(-3.50) *** 
-0.126 
(-2.96)***       
-0.185 
(-3.65)***        
-0.184 
(-3.64)***     
-0.133 
(-3.07)***        
-0.131 
(-3.01)***        
-0.118 
(-2.87)***        
FOREIGN α9 0.391 
(22.67) *** 
0.501 
(19.80) *** 
0.486 
(17.75) *** 
0.397 
(15.46)***      
0.480 
(15.98)***       
0.506 
(16.35)***       
0.429 
(16.42)***        
0.431 
(18.63)***       
0.418 
(18.00)***       
DISCOP α10 0.368 
(6.02) *** 
0.330 
(5.25) *** 
0.380 
(5.30) *** 
0.269  
(4.63)***       
0.458 
(5.51)***        
0.416 
(5.25)***     
0.296 
(4.90)***        
0.331 
(5.31)***       
0.249 
(4.08)***        
CROSS α11   0.501
(6.40) *** 
0.472 
(5.80) *** 
0.516 
(7.02)***       
0.348 
(5.30)***        
0.423 
(5.46)***        
0.527 
(6.70)***         
0.462 
(6.50)***        
0.520 
(6.92)***        
UTILITY α12 -0.132 
(-3.54)** 
-0.278 
(-7.89) *** 
-0.325 
(-9.35)*** 
-0.296 
(-9.44)***       
-0.411 
(-10.46)***       
-0.467 
(-14.24)***       
-0.191 
(-5.94)***        
-0.359 
(-10.67)***       
 -0.324 
(-10.57)***       
TENURE α13 0.003 
(1.73) 
0.001 
(0.53) 
0.006 
(3.22) *** 
-0.004  
(-1.91)*       
0.014 
(4.56)***        
0.010 
(4.08)***        
-0.001 
(-0.42)         
0.000 
(0.05)          
-0.005 
(-2.28)**        
LCIFAR α14   0.093
(8.21) *** 
0.061 
(4.33) *** 
0.058 
(4.51)***       
0.066 
(4.04)***        
0.071 
(4.37)***        
0.054 
(4.27)***        
0.054 
(4.56)***        
0.080 
(7.15)***        
SMDEV α15   -0.019
(-0.25) 
-0.327 
(-4.17) *** 
-0.414 
(-5.88)***       
-0.431 
(-5.87)***        
-0.377 
(-3.68)***        
-0.096 
(-1.16)         
-0.322 
(-6.31)***       
-0.201 
(-2.62)***        
MEASURE α16   0.397
(6.82) *** 
0.405 
(3.34) *** 
1.213 
(7.88)***       
0.221 
(4.00)***         
0.048 
(0.69)          
-0.644 
(-7.09)***        
-0.224 
(-13.29)***     
-0.509 
(-7.73)***       
SPEC* MEASURE α17   -0143
(-4.73) *** 
-0.275 
(-3.19) *** 
-0.441 
(-4.88)***       
-0.1253 
(-3.58)***    
-0.108 
(-2.06)**        
0.276 
(4.67)***         
0.061 
(3.66)***     
0.152 
(3.84)***        
Adj.R2 (%)  66.74 73.47 69.87 74.03 69.80 68.07 73.45 75.23 74.40 
N    9381 29840 29840 29840 29840 29840 29840 29840 29840
*, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively 
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